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Over the course of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis members of the euro area have put up 
significant resources to stabilize the financial situation of a few fellow member states. In 
Germany, this support is subject to a controversial discussion. One aspect in that is the extent 
of support provided. Using the financial assistance provided to Greece as an example, this 
paper sheds some light on the financial burden for Germany in comparison to other member 
states of the euro area, especially Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This implies not only an 
interesting comparison of strains between large and small economies but also between 
original and later euro area members. 
 






Im Verlauf der Europäischen Staatsschuldenkrise haben die Mitgliedsländer der Eurozone 
signifikante Beiträge zur Stabilisierung der öffentlichen Haushalte in einigen anderen 
Mitgliedsländern geleistet. Diese Unterstützung ist nicht zuletzt wegen ihres Umfangs in 
Deutschland sehr umstritten. Am Beispiel der Finanzhilfen für Griechenland ordnet das 
vorliegende Papier den Umfang der Unterstützungsleistungen ein durch einen Vergleich der 
Belastungen zwischen Deutschland und den anderen Euro-Mitgliedsländern, insbesondere 
Estland, Lettland und Litauen. Es handelt sich damit um einen interessanten Vergleich nicht 
nur zwischen großen und kleinen Volkswirtschaften sondern auch zwischen einem 
Gründungsmitglied der Währungsunion und Mitgliedern, die erst später der Währungsunion 
beigetreten sind. 
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author thanks Baltisch-Deutsches Hochschulkontor for financial support of the seminar, Janis Priede for the 
organisation of the seminar and him and Rainer Hillebrand for helpful comments. 
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On Tuesday, 20 October 2009, George Papaconstantinou, the finance minister in the new 
Greek government that had been elected a few weeks earlier, raised estimates on the 
country’s budget deficit for the ongoing year (Barber 2009): While the former government 
had obviously understated the figure by forecasting a deficit of 6-8% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), Mr. Papaconstantinou now projected a deficit of about 12.5%. 
 
Although the older estimates had already been well above the 3% threshold set by the euro 
area’s Stability and Growth Pact, this disclosure kicked off what later became known as the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis. A sequence of bailout measures followed, targeting Greece 
and a few additional euro area members. 
 
The events confirmed widespread concerns about the stability of the euro area that had 
repeatedly been voiced by many in Germany on the road towards the single currency. In a 
statement published in September 1990 the Bundesbank, for example, said that the effects of 
a currency union would “crucially depend on economic and fiscal policy … in all member 
states” and observed “deep-seated divergences” with respect to the evolution of costs and 
prices, high budget deficits and external imbalances especially for the United Kingdom, 
Portugal and Greece, but also for Italy and Spain; it characterized a currency union as an 
“irrevocable” community of solidarity (Bundesbank 1990, pp.40-41). Analysing the potential 
impact of the monetary union on fiscal policy Homburg (1997, p.102) concludes that realising 
the monetary union simultaneously implies assuming joint liabilities among member states: 
This community will be asymmetrical, transfers are likely to go from larger to smaller members 
because – in contrast to smaller members – large members cannot rely on relief measures.  
 
Thus, it is not surprising that there was a fierce discussion in Germany whether to provide 
financial aid to Greece and to other member states in the debt crisis. Opponents of such aid 
for the time being had to realize the ineffectiveness of Article 126 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU; European Union 2012), the infamous no-bailout 
clause.3 Germany, as an existing member of the monetary union, was indeed “inextricably 
linked” to the other member states “in the monetary field, come what may” as predicted by 
Bundesbank (1990, p.40). 
 
Germany was not the only country where there was a debate whether to contribute to the 
financial assistance for Greece. The Slovak parliament, for example, decided against a 
participation in the initial programme after the government pointed out that Slovakia, despite 
being significantly poorer than Greece, had avoided undue debts itself through rigid reforms 
(Groszkowski 2010). 
 
Interestingly, further countries entered the euro area when the debt crisis was already in full 
swing: Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015. All three accepted their 
responsibility as euro area members, joined central rescue institutions such as the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and contributed to bailout measures. 
 
                                                     
3  Homburg (1997, p.99-100) discusses the obvious conflict between the precursors of Article 122 TFEU and 
Article 126 TFEU. 
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This paper analyses the impact of bailout measures on Germany as opposed to the group of 
Baltic states, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The comparison is relevant for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, there is the difference in the timing of membership in the euro area: In the 
comparison Germany represents the set of initial members of the euro area, the three Baltic 
states the group of later members or – to be more precise – the group of members joining 
after the emergence of the Greek debt crisis. Secondly, there is the difference in size of the 
economy, measured e.g. in terms of nominal GDP: In 2016, Germany as the largest economy 
has contributed 29.28% to the euro area’s GDP while Estonia (0.19%), Latvia (0.23%) and 
Lithuania (0.36%) have been among the smallest economies, only Cyprus (0.17%) and Malta 
(0.09%) being even smaller (Eurostat 2017a). Thereby, the analysis sheds some light on 
whether smaller members or later members are impacted less than larger or initial members.4 
 
The analysis focuses on the exposure from the tax payer’s perspective and thus excludes the 
exposure of the private sector. As is discussed in further detail below it is restricted to the 
three economic adjustment programmes provided to Greece since 2010. The cut-off date for 
the analysis is 30 June 2017. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
financial assistance in the form of three economic adjustment programmes. The discussion 
remains on the aggregate level, i.e. on the level of the entire euro area and of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Chapter 3 then breaks down the resulting exposure by members state 
of the euro area and provides additional analyses by relating the exposure to GDP and General 








After the 2009 elections, the new Greek government was well aware of the priority of “fiscal 
management” and the need to “restore the confidence of the international markets” (Prime 
Minister of the Hellenic Republic 2009). The budget for 2010 that passed the Greek parliament 
on 23 December 2009 foresaw a reduced deficit of 9.1% of GDP. Nevertheless, further 
immediate corrective and stabilizing actions had to be announced and undertaken by Greece 
in the upcoming weeks and months thereafter. As outlined by the European Commission 
(2010, p.13-14), these actions were not sufficient to stabilize Greek government bond spreads 
with the ultimate consequence that Greece officially requested financial assistance from the 
member states of the euro area and the IMF on 23 April 2010. 
 
What followed is a series of three programmes of financial assistance currently spanning the 
time period of 2010 to 2018 which will be described in further detail below. For the purpose 
of this paper it is interesting to note the chronology of programmes, the establishment of 
                                                     
4  There already are a few general impact analyses available such as Barclays (2015), ifo Institut (2017) or Sbaihi 
(2015). In contrast to these analyses the paper at hand focuses on the specific comparison while also 
providing a fully traceable calculation of exposures. 
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European rescue institutions and the adoption of the euro by the three Baltic states which is 
set out in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Chronology of events 
 
 
Sources: European Commission (2017); ESM (2017b), p.5; ESM (2017e) 
 
 
2.2. The Economic Adjustment Programme (2010-2013) 
 
Financial assistance by means of the first three-year programme, also known as “Greek Loan 
Facility”, was announced on 02 May 2010 (European Commission 2010, p.13). The financial 
assistance provided by the programme initially totalled at €110bn. Thereof, €80bn were 
provided as bilateral loans of the member states of the euro area and €30bn as IMF support 
in the form of a Stand-By Arrangement (European Commission 2010, p.31). 
 
In August 2010 Slovakia decided to withhold its contribution to the programme, and Ireland 
and Portugal later requested financial assistance themselves with the result that the euro 
area’s contribution reduced by €2.7bn to €77.3bn (Economist 2010; European Commission 
2017). 
 
Until December 2011 a total of €73bn out of the adjusted programme total of €107.3bn had 
been released, €52.9 thereof had been disbursed by the euro area’s members and €20.1bn by 
the IMF as shown in table 1. The extent of disbursements made by the member states and by 













Euro area 52.9 77.3 68.43% 
IMF 20.1 30.0 67.00% 
Total 73.0 107.3 68.03% 
 
Sources: European Commission (2012), p.5; own calculations 
 
 
2.3. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme (2012-2015/2016) 
 
The second programme succeeded the initial adjustment programme well before the latter’s 
intended end. The need for a new programme arose because the sustainability of the Greek 
government debt became questionable. Approved on 14 March 2012 by the euro area’s 
finance ministers it came in time to prevent a default of Greece (European Commission 2017; 
Traynor, Smith 2012). 
 
Under the new programme the euro area members committed €144.7bn and the IMF €28bn 
including the unspent amounts of the initial programme (European Commission 2012, p.4; 
European Commission 2017). 
 
In contrast to the initial programme, the euro area contribution was no longer provided in the 
form of bilateral loans but was financed through the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF). A further important detail of the programme was that the euro member states agreed 
to defer the maturities of the bilateral loans provided under the first programme by 15 years 
(European Commission 2017). 
 
The IMF contribution was arranged under the Extended Fund Facility against cancellation of 
the Stand-By Arrangement of the first programme which would have expired by March 2013; 
it foresaw a disbursement in 17 equal tranches between March 2012 and February 2016 (IMF 
2012, p.1). 
 
The euro area’s part of the programme was supposed to expire at the end of 2014. By that 
date the IMF would have released 12 tranches bringing the IMF exposure to €19.8bn and the 
programme’s total to €164.5bn (European Commission 2012, p.46). However, the euro area 
component was later extended to 30 June 2015 (European Commission 2017). 
 
Table 2 shows that out of the commitment of €144.7bn actually €130.9bn had been paid out 
to Greece by end of June 2015. The IMF’s last disbursement was released on 30 May 2014 
which increased the total IMF disbursement to SDR 10.2bn or about €11.6bn (IMF 2014).5 
 
 
                                                     












EFSF 130.9 144.7 90.46% 
IMF 11.6 19.8 58.59% 
Total 142.5 164.5 86.63% 
 
Sources: ESM (2017d); IMF (2014); own calculations 
 
 
2.4. The Third Economic Adjustment Programme (2015-2018) 
 
After expiry of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme the Greek government on 08 
July 2015 filed a request with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the successor to the 
EFSF, for further financial assistance. Greek had just missed a debt payment to the IMF and 
lacked sufficient liquidity to meet its debt obligations (ESM 2016, p.48). 
 
A new agreement on a Third Economic Adjustment Programme was reached in August 2015. 
The ESM committed an additional €86bn of financial assistance to the Greek republic. The 
assistance is available from August 2015 to August 2018. Repayment of the loans shall 
commence in 2034 (ESM 2017d). The IMF did not participate in the programme. 
 
As of 30 June 2017, the ESM had disbursed a total of €31.7 in seven payments (ESM 2016, 
p.48; ESM 2017b, p.47; ESM 2017c). In February 2017, the ESM received a repayment of €2bn 
(ESM 2017a). Thus, as of 30 June 2017, the outstanding loan amount equalled €29.7bn and 
unused, open commitments summed up to €54.3bn. 
 
 




This chapter analyses the impact of the financial assistance described in chapter 2 by outlining 
the resulting exposure for all member states of the euro area excluding Greece as of 30 June 
2017. 
 
The discussion first distinguishes between a direct and an indirect exposure. For the purposes 
of the analysis, a direct exposure is defined as an exposure that results from the financial 
assistance provided either bilaterally by the euro area’s member states or through the 
stabilization institutions created by these states during the debt crisis. The indirect exposure 
is understood to be due to IMF assistance. 
 
The total exposure is then analysed both in absolute and relative terms with a particular focus 





3.2. Direct exposure 
 
In May 2010, upon agreement on the initial Economic Adjustment Programme, the euro area 
consisted of 16 members6. According to European Commission (2010, p.31) the contribution 
of each member to the programme depended on its share in “adjusted ECB paid capital”. As 
has already been noted above, Ireland and Portugal did not fully participate and Slovakia did 
not participate at all in the bilateral loan programme. 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the member states’ disbursements under the first 
programme. As the loans have not yet matured these amounts are identical to the direct 
exposure of the member states resulting from the programme.  
 
 
























(a) Not yet a euro area member 
(b) Last contribution in September 2010 
(c) Last contribution in March 2011 
(d) Contribution withheld 
 
Source: European Commission (2012), p.5-6 
 
 
                                                     
6  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain 
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Between the initial and the Second Economic Adjustment Programme Estonia adopted the 
euro on 01 January 2011. It then joined the EFSF in late September of the same year (Reuters 
2011). Thus, the EFSF’s commitment under the second programme in principle affects all 17 
member of the euro area as of 01 January 2011. Table 4 shows the respective exposures given 
the disbursed amount of €130.9bn (see table 2). Again, the disbursed amount is identical to 
the outstanding loan amount. 
 
 








Austria 2.7750% 2.9869% 3.91 
Belgium 3.4666% 3.7313% 4.88 
Cyprus(a) 0.1957% 0.0000% 0.00 
Estonia 0.2558% 0.2753% 0.36 
Finland 1.7920% 1.9288% 2.52 
France 20.3246% 21.8763% 28.64 
Germany 27.0647% 29.1309% 38.13 
Ireland(a) 1.5874% 0.0000% 0.00 
Italy 17.8598% 19.2233% 25.16 
Latvia(b) -- -- 0.00 
Lithuania(b) -- -- 0.00 
Luxembourg 0.2497% 0.2688% 0.35 
Malta 0.0903% 0.0972% 0.13 
Netherlands 5.6998% 6.1349% 8.03 
Portugal(a) 2.5016% 0.0000% 0.00 
Slovakia 0.9910% 1.0667% 1.40 
Slovenia 0.4699% 0.5058% 0.66 
Spain 11.8679% 12.7739% 16.72 
Total 97.1918%(c) 100.0000% 130.90 
 
(a) Stepping-Out Guarantor 
(b) Not yet a euro area member 
(c) Excluding Greece; the contribution key of Greece is 2.8082% 
(d) Excluding all Stepping-Out Guarantors 
 
Sources: EFSF (2011), p.40; ESM (2017d); own calculations 
 
 
The EFSF is a public limited company with a share capital paid in by 17 euro area members. 
The financial assistance provided by the EFSF is refinanced through the issue of debt securities 
using a mixture of different maturities. The debt securities are guaranteed by the shareholders 
of the EFSF according to their EFSF contribution keys. The second column of table 4 contains 
the original contribution keys. According to Annex 2 of the EFSF Framework Agreement (EFSF 
2011) they are obtained by dividing the member’s ECB capital subscription key by the share 
of euro area members in the capital of the ECB, i.e. they are identical to the share of the 




However, according to Article 7 (2) of the EFSF Framework Agreement a shareholder can 
choose to become a Stepping-Out Guarantor if it requests financial assistance from the EFSF 
itself. If a shareholder has become a Stepping-Out Guarantor it will be excluded from the 
guarantee of all debt securities that will be issued from then on (Preamble (4), EFSF 
Framework Agreement). This will increase the contribution key for remaining guarantors in all 
new issues. The consequence of this construction is that the exposure of EFSF shareholders 
will rise if the number of Stepping-Out Guarantors increases and/or if there is a roll-over of 
debt instruments that originally had been issued under a smaller number of Stepping-Out 
Guarantors. 
 
As of 30 June 2017, Cyprus, Ireland, Greece and Portugal are existing Stepping-Out Guarantors 
(EFSF 2017, p.62-63). Ireland, Greece and Portugal already had been Stepping-Out Guarantors 
when the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was launched. Cyprus became 
a Stepping-Out Guarantor in 2013. The third and fourth column of table 4 contain the revised 
contribution keys for the remaining guarantors and the resulting exposures.7 
 
As has been discussed above the outstanding loan amount under the Third Economic 
Adjustment Programme currently amounts to €29.7bn. Open, unused commitments sum up 
to €54.3bn. The total ESM exposure against Greece is the sum of both positions, i.e. €84bn. 
 
All 19 euro area members, now including both Latvia and Lithuania who joined the euro area 
on 01 January 2014 and 01 January 2015 respectively, have become ESM shareholders. The 
construction of the ESM differs from that of the EFSF as the shareholders do not provide any 
guarantees beyond the share capital. According to Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty, ESM 2015) the authorised capital of the 
Mechanism is €704.80bn consisting of €80.55bn paid-in capital and €624.25bn callable capital. 
Contribution keys define the capital contribution of shareholders. The contribution keys are 
obtained in a way identical to the EFSF. The liability of shareholders is limited to their share in 
authorised capital. 
 
In principle, the unpaid capital is callable at any time upon request by the ESM’s Board of 
Governors (ESM Treaty, Article 9 (1)). A call is foreseen by Article 9 (2) of the ESM Treaty if – 
due to losses – the paid-in capital falls below €80.55bn. The call should restore the paid-in 
capital to that minimum level. If a member misses its capital call the remaining members have 
to provide the difference which, however, does not release the defaulting member from its 
capital obligations (Article 25 (2), ESM Treaty). 
 
The equivalence of an EFSF Stepping-Out Guarantor is not foreseen in the ESM Treaty. To the 
contrary, Article 8 (5) of the ESM Treaty specifies that the obligation to contribute the 
authorised capital is not affected by eligibility for, or provision of, financial assistance. 
 
Losses will be covered by ESM reserves first, then by paid-in capital and finally by capital calls 
(Article 25 (1), ESM Treaty). 
                                                     
7  The exposures assume that the entire disbursed amount is guaranteed by the 13 remaining member states 
only. Insofar they currently represent an upper loss limit because Cyprus is still guaranteeing older debt 
securities and will only gradually step-out if these securities need a roll-over. However, the actual losses of 
individual member states might even be higher because the member states typically over-guarantee 
individual debt securities to an extent of up to 165% (Article 2 (3), EFSF Framework Agreement). 
 
 10 










Austria 2.7644% 2.23 2.8440% 2.39 
Belgium 3.4534% 2.78 3.5528% 2.98 
Cyprus 0.1949% 0.16 0.2005% 0.17 
Estonia 0.1847% 0.15 0.1900% 0.16 
Finland 1.7852% 1.44 1.8366% 1.54 
France 20.2471% 16.31 20.8298% 17.50 
Germany 26.9616% 21.72 27.7376% 23.30 
Ireland 1.5814% 1.27 1.6269% 1.37 
Italy 17.7917% 14.33 18.3037% 15.38 
Latvia 0.2746% 0.22 0.2825% 0.24 
Lithuania 0.4063% 0.33 0.4180% 0.35 
Luxembourg 0.2487% 0.20 0.2559% 0.21 
Malta 0.0726% 0.06 0.0747% 0.06 
Netherlands 5.6781% 4.57 5.8415% 4.91 
Portugal 2.4921% 2.01 2.5638% 2.15 
Slovakia 0.8184% 0.66 0.8420% 0.71 
Slovenia 0.4247% 0.34 0.4369% 0.37 
Spain 11.8227% 9.52 12.1630% 10.22 
Total 97.2025%(a) 80.55 100.0000% 84.00 
 
(a) Excluding Greece; the contribution key of Greece is 2.7975% 
 
Sources: ESM (2015); own calculations 
 
 
If Greece defaulted on its ESM obligations the ESM would lose a maximum of €84bn. Under 
the assumption of reserves of zero this would consume the current paid-in capital of 
€80.55bn. Greece would lose €2.25bn, the remaining 18 shareholders a total of €78.3bn. 
 
The ESM would have to issue a call for capital for €84bn, €80.55bn for restoring the paid-in 
capital and €3.45bn to cover the losses exceeding the paid-in capital. In that situation Greece 
would not be able to contribute to the call. The capital call would have to be borne by the 18 
remaining shareholders according to “revised” contribution keys. 
 
What does that mean for today’s exposure of the shareholders other than Greece (G)? The 
exposure of member 𝑖 ≠ 𝐺 consists of three components:8 
 
1. The paid-in capital of member 𝑖, 𝐶𝑖 = 𝐶𝑐𝑖, 




                                                     
8  The extent to which the second component is higher than the theoretical contribution including the 
participation of Greece as well as the entire third component define a new obligation for Greece and, thus, 
an asset for the remaining shareholders. This does not represent an immediate loss but defines a new 
exposure against Greece. Thus, it should be included in the exposure calculation. 
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where 𝐶 is ESM’s paid-in capital, 𝑐𝑖 (𝑐𝐺) the contribution key of member 𝑖 (Greece) and 𝐿 the 
total loss from ESM’s assistance to Greece (𝐿 > 𝐶). The revised contribution key for member 
𝑖 is equal to 𝑐𝑖 (1 − 𝑐𝐺)⁄ . Thus, the exposure is equal to 
 














or – verbally – the total loss from ESM’s assistance to Greece multiplied with the revised 
contribution key for member 𝑖. Table 5 shows the resulting exposure by ESM shareholder. 
 
 
3.3. Indirect exposure 
 
In addition to the exposure resulting from the direct financial assistance provided by the euro 
area and its stabilization institutions the member states have a further, indirect exposure vis-
à-vis Greece that could result from a number of facts. 
 
First, the IMF has participated in the first two economic adjustment programmes. As of 30 
June 2017, the outstanding debt reported by IMF (2017a) for Greece equals 9.99bn Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR) which are the result of the Extended Fund Facility (second adjustment 
programme). Valued at an exchange rate of €1.219230 per SDR9 the outstanding loan amount 
is equal to €12.18bn. IMF members have a technical, shared exposure according to their IMF 
Quota. 
 
Second, between May 2010 and September 2012 the European Central Bank (ECB) used 
secondary markets to purchase bonds from issuers in selected member states of the Euro area 
(Securities Markets Programme – SMP). While the programme was not restricted to 
government bonds, Bundesbank (2017) mentions that “especially” government bonds had 
been purchased under this programme. As of 30 June 2017, the ECB still held €98.67bn worth 
of bonds (ECB 2017c). As of 31 December 2016, about 12.02% of holdings were in Greek bonds 
(ECB 2017a).10 
 
In principle, the member states of the euro area have an exposure resulting from the SMP 
should losses occur. Losses would be transmitted to the member states in the form of a 
reduced profit distribution by the ECB to National Central Banks (NCBs) in the respective fiscal 
year(s). Should the ECB book a loss in a given fiscal year, the key issue is if eventually the ECB 
would need to be recapitalized which is not mandatory (see e.g. Hirdina 2014). 
 
Third, the ECB and the NCBs exchange payments through the TARGET2 system. At a given 
point in time the NCBs have either net claims or net liabilities vis-à-vis the ECB. As of 30 June 
                                                     
9  Exchange rate as of 30 June 2017; see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_mth.aspx?SelectDate 
=2017-06-30&reportType=CVSDR (22 August 2017). 
10  The structure of SMP holdings by country of issuer is only disclosed at year end. 
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2017, ECB (2017d) reports a net claim of €860.8bn for the Bundesbank and a net liability of 
€76bn for the Greek central bank. While Sinn (2012), for example, strongly advocates to 
interpret net claims as a measure of outstanding public loans provided to countries with a net 
liability which would be at risk if the euro area falls apart, ECB (2017b, p.22-23) provides a 
more technical explanation of financial market structures in the context of the ongoing ECB 
bond purchases. 
 
Since the focus of this paper is on the impact of the economic adjustment programmes and 
since the exposure implications of the other activities is less clear, only the exposure resulting 
from the IMF contributions in these programmes are considered as indirect exposures. Table 
6 has the results using “adjusted” IMF Quotas. The impact of the indirect exposure is relatively 
low because of (a) the IMF’s comparably small outstanding loan amount and (b) the reduced 
relevance of euro area members within the IMF as opposed to their relevance within the euro 
area: 21.63% of the IMF exposure or €2.65bn have to be attributed to the 18 euro area 
members excluding Greece. 
 
 
Table 6: Indirect exposure resulting from IMF commitments 





Austria 0.83% 0.8343% 0.10 
Belgium 1.35% 1.3569% 0.17 
Cyprus 0.06% 0.0603% 0.01 
Estonia 0.05% 0.0503% 0.01 
Finland 0.51% 0.5126% 0.06 
France 4.24% 4.2617% 0.52 
Germany 5.60% 5.6287% 0.69 
Ireland 0.73% 0.7337% 0.09 
Italy 3.17% 3.1862% 0.39 
Latvia 0.07% 0.0704% 0.01 
Lithuania 0.09% 0.0905% 0.01 
Luxembourg 0.28% 0.2814% 0.03 
Malta 0.04% 0.0402% 0.00 
Netherlands 1.84% 1.8494% 0.23 
Portugal 0.43% 0.4322% 0.05 
Slovakia 0.21% 0.2111% 0.03 
Slovenia 0.12% 0.1206% 0.01 
Spain 2.01% 2.0203% 0.25 
Total 21.63% 21.7409% 2.65 
 
(a) Excluding Greece; the IMF Quota of Greece is 0.51% 
 






3.4. Total exposure 
 
In sum, the member states of the euro area have directly provided a total of €267.8bn of 
financial assistance to Greece. The initial program accounts for 19.75% of this total, the second 
programme for 48.88% and the third programme for the remaining 31.37%. As of 30 June 
2017, out of this total exposure €54.3bn have not been disbursed yet. 
 
Through the IMF a further €2.65bn have been indirectly committed. Thus, the total financial 
assistance of the euro area for Greece amounts to €270.45bn. The disbursed amount of 
€213.53bn is equal to 67.81% of Greek’s gross debt of €314.90bn at the end of 2016.11 
 
Table 7 contains the total exposure by member state and the corresponding ranking by 
exposure. With an exposure of €77.28bn Germany has the largest absolute exposure. It is well 
ahead of the next largest economies in the euro area, France and Italy. The Baltic states are 
on rank 14 (Estonia), 15 (Lithuania) and 17 (Latvia). 
 
 
Table 7: Total exposure resulting from the economic adjustment programmes 
Member 
state 












Austria 1.55 3.91 2.39 0.10 7.96 7 
Belgium 1.94 4.88 2.98 0.17 9.98 6 
Cyprus 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.29 16 
Estonia 0.00 0.36 0.16 0.01 0.53 14 
Finland 1.00 2.52 1.54 0.06 5.13 8 
France 11.39 28.64 17.50 0.52 58.04 2 
Germany 15.17 38.13 23.30 0.69 77.28 1 
Ireland 0.35 0.00 1.37 0.09 1.80 11 
Italy 10.01 25.16 15.38 0.39 50.93 3 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.25 17 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.36 15 
Luxembourg 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.03 0.74 13 
Malta 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.25 18 
Netherlands 3.19 8.03 4.91 0.23 16.36 5 
Portugal 1.10 0.00 2.15 0.05 3.31 9 
Slovakia 0.00 1.40 0.71 0.03 2.13 10 
Slovenia 0.24 0.66 0.37 0.01 1.29 12 
Spain 6.65 16.72 10.22 0.25 33.83 4 
Total 52.90 130.90 84.00 2.65 270.45 -- 
 
(a) 1 represents the largest, 18 the smallest exposure 
 
Source: own calculations 
  
                                                     
11  Source: Eurostat (2017b) 
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Estonia’s direct burden from the Second Economic Adjustment Programme (€0.36bn) is larger 
than the entire direct exposure of both Latvia (€0.24bn) and Lithuania (€0.35bn). The early 
adoption of the euro in Estonia is a disadvantage from this perspective because it caused 
Estonia’s participation in the second programme, which is the largest among the three. 
 
Cyprus (rank 16) and Malta (rank 18) are also among the smallest contributors where Cyprus 
benefits from its role as Stepping-Out Guarantor under the Second Economic Adjustment 
Programme. 
 
To provide a different perspective on the impact of being a Stepping-Out Guarantor or a late 
adopter of the euro, for example, table 8 shows the relative importance of each exposure 
component for a country’s total exposure. For member states who fully participated in all 
three economic adjustment programmes the relative importance of the direct exposure 
components is identical (not shown in the table). The differences shown in table 8 e.g. for 
Austria, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg are only to due the differences in indirect 
exposures. It should also be noted that the relative importance of the indirect component is 
typically larger for smaller countries than for larger countries (e.g. Austria, Finland or 
Luxembourg vs. France, Germany or Italy). This effect is, of course, even more pronounced if 
a small country is a Stepping-Out Guarantor (Cyprus) or a late adopter of the euro (especially 
Latvia and Lithuania). 
 
 
Table 8: Relative importance of exposure components for a member state’s total exposure 
Member 
state 
Direct exposure Indirect 
exposure 
Total 
exposure Initial prog. Second prog. Third prog. 
Austria 19.55% 49.15% 30.03% 1.28% 100.00% 
Belgium 19.47% 48.96% 29.91% 1.66% 100.00% 
Cyprus 38.41% 0.00% 59.02% 2.57% 100.00% 
Estonia 0.00% 68.50% 30.34% 1.16% 100.00% 
Finland 19.56% 49.18% 30.05% 1.22% 100.00% 
France 19.62% 49.34% 30.15% 0.89% 100.00% 
Germany 19.62% 49.34% 30.15% 0.89% 100.00% 
Ireland 19.26% 0.00% 75.78% 4.96% 100.00% 
Italy 19.65% 49.40% 30.19% 0.76% 100.00% 
Latvia 0.00% 0.00% 96.51% 3.49% 100.00% 
Lithuania 0.00% 0.00% 96.96% 3.04% 100.00% 
Luxembourg 18.88% 47.48% 29.01% 4.63% 100.00% 
Malta 20.61% 51.83% 25.56% 2.00% 100.00% 
Netherlands 19.53% 49.10% 30.00% 1.38% 100.00% 
Portugal 33.32% 0.00% 65.09% 1.59% 100.00% 
Slovakia 0.00% 65.58% 33.22% 1.21% 100.00% 
Slovenia 18.92% 51.43% 28.51% 1.14% 100.00% 
Spain 19.65% 49.42% 30.20% 0.73% 100.00% 
Total 19.56% 48.40% 31.06% 0.98% 100.00% 
 
Source: own calculations 
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Beyond the discussion of absolute exposures, it is necessary to analyse how exposures relate 
to a country’s economic capabilities, i.e. its ability to compensate for the exposures in the case 
of a Greek default. Taking the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a proxy for the economic 
capabilities and then relating a country’s exposure to its GDP in 2016 (see figure 2), it becomes 
obvious that many smaller countries have a higher relative burden than countries with a large 
absolute exposure.12 For the Baltic states, this is true for Estonia which ranks sixth. Latvia and 




Figure 2: Exposure in % of GDP 2016 
 
Sources: Eurostat (2017a); own calculations 
 
 
Germany, the country with the highest exposure is among middle-ranking countries only. The 
ranking of France, Germany and Italy is – at first sight – surprising because the indirect 
exposure is not able to explain the change in ranking (see table 8) and because the direct 
exposure is a result of ECB capital keys which are related to the GDP. However, the ECB capital 
keys do not only consider the GDP of a member state but also its population as defined in 
Article 29 of the ECB Statutes (Protocol (No 4) to the TFEU (European Union 2012)). Within 
the euro area, France’s and – especially – Italy’s share in the population is higher than the 
share in GDP.13 
 
                                                     
12  Table A.1 in the appendix contains the numerical values. 
13  A further reason is that ECB capital keys are not continuously updated to changes in GDP and population. 
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Do countries with a small GDP tend to have a higher relative exposure? As has already been 
outlined, figure 2 conveys a somewhat mixed picture. This is confirmed by a rank correlation 
of 0.29. If countries with a small GDP (large rank in GDP) would indeed tend to have a higher 
relative exposure (small rank in relative exposure) the correlation should be negative and 
should tend towards -1.14 
 
Finally, it may be interesting to see how the exposures relate to the existing public debt of a 
country. The existing public debt is an indicator for the own financial austerity in the past. 
There may be economic as well as non-economic arguments to judge a given exposure 
differently, depending on whether the country in question has accumulated a significant level 
of own debt or not. Figure 3 shows the share of absolute exposures in General Government 
Gross Debt in 2016.15 
 
 
Figure 3: Exposure in % of government gross debt 2016
 
Sources: Eurostat (2017b); own calculations 
 
 
By that indicator Estonia is most severely affected by the financial assistance to Greece: The 
total exposure from the financial assistance is equal to 26.51% of existing government debt. 
Runner-up, albeit with a significant gap, is another small economy, Luxembourg where the 
share is 6.83%. Latvia and Lithuania rank 12th (2.45%) and 13th (2.33%). Germany (3.61%) again 
is among the middle ranks, this time close to Spain and France. The overall picture is that 
                                                     
14  Figure A.1 in the appendix provides a graphical analysis of this question. Excluding Stepping-Out Guarantors 
from the analysis does not significantly change the correlation coefficient. 
15  Table A.2 in the appendix has detailed numerical information. 
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smaller countries tend to be affected more while late adopters and Stepping-Out Guarantors 
tend to be found at higher ranks. 
 
Countries with a very large government debt may occupy a large rank in figure 3 despite a 
large absolute exposure. A good example would be Italy. The correlation between the rank by 
government debt (large rank = small debt) and the rank by relative exposure (large rank = 
small relative exposure) is -0.39.16 Thus, if any, there is a lose tendency that countries with a 
large (small) debt have a small (large) relative exposure. Estonia would be the most prominent 





Against fundamental construction principles of the single currency Greece has received and is 
still receiving significant financial assistance from fellow members in the euro area. Not 
surprisingly this financial assistance was not granted without significant debates within and 
between member states. A very clear statement was made by the Slovak parliament, for 
example, when rejecting the Greek Loan Facility. 
 
Despite the controversial discussion about the financial assistance for Greece, the Baltic states 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania not only decided to adopt the euro while the crisis was in full 
swing but also met their obligations by becoming members of EFSF and ESM although – similar 
to Slovakia – all three would have had good reasons to withhold any financial assistance for 
Greece. 
 
As a consequence of timing, Estonia already provided guarantees under the Second Economic 
Adjustment Programme while Latvia and Lithuania only had to participate in the Third 
Economic Adjustment Programme. For Estonia, this resulted in an exposure which is 
significant in size, especially when compared to current levels of Estonian government debt. 
The impact for Latvia and Lithuania was less dramatic, also because the third programme is 
significantly smaller in size. 
 
The exposure in relation to government debt and – in some cases – also in relation to GDP in 
general is higher for many smaller countries than for large economies such as Germany and 
France that exhibit the highest absolute exposures. Being small was not necessarily 
“beautiful”, i.e. it did not guarantee a small relative exposure. Being late, however, was. 
 
The provision of financial assistance has implemented the community of solidarity predicted 
by Bundesbank (1990). The ESM’s current financial endowment supports the view of Homburg 
(1997) on the asymmetry of this community to the disadvantage of larger member states who 
cannot expect financial support in a debt crisis. This paper added a further, more technical 
dimension of asymmetry: the relative burden resulting from financial assistance can be larger 
for smaller member states. 
 
This should not be misinterpreted as a call for a revision of member states’ contributions to 
the ESM. The criteria potentially relevant for a fair sharing of burdens are simply too manifold, 
                                                     
16  See figure A.2 in the appendix for a visualisation. 
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and fairness is a normative target. In the controversies within and between member states it 
should be kept in mind, however, that an asymmetry can have multiple dimensions. 
 
Moreover, the key issue now is to enable Greece to repay its obligations in the long run. This 
is in the interest of all members states of the euro area, whether large or small, early or late. 



















% of GDP 
Rank by 
exposure in 
% of GDP(b) 
Austria 7.96 349.34 7 2.28% 12 
Belgium 9.98 421.61 6 2.37% 10 
Cyprus 0.29 17.90 17 1.59% 14 
Estonia 0.53 20.92 16 2.52% 6 
Finland 5.13 215.62 9 2.38% 9 
France 58.04 2,228.86 2 2.60% 5 
Germany 77.28 3,144.05 1 2.46% 8 
Ireland 1.80 275.57 8 0.65% 18 
Italy 50.93 1,672.44 3 3.05% 2 
Latvia 0.25 25.02 15 0.98% 16 
Lithuania 0.36 38.64 14 0.94% 17 
Luxembourg 0.74 54.19 12 1.37% 15 
Malta 0.25 9.90 18 2.48% 7 
Netherlands 16.36 702.64 5 2.33% 11 
Portugal 3.31 184.93 10 1.79% 13 
Slovakia 2.13 80.96 11 2.63% 4 
Slovenia 1.29 39.77 13 3.24% 1 
Spain 33.83 1,113.85 4 3.04% 3 
Total 270.45 10,596.20 -- 2.55% -- 
 
(a) 1 represents the largest, 18 the smallest GDP 
(b) 1 represents the highest, 18 the lowest relative exposure 
 





Figure A.1: GDP 2016 vs. exposure in % of GDP 2016 
 

















% of debt 
Rank by 
exposure in 
% of debt(b) 
Austria 7.96 295.72 7 2.69% 11 
Belgium 9.98 446.82 5 2.23% 15 
Cyprus 0.29 19.30 13 1.48% 16 
Estonia 0.53 1.98 18 26.51% 1 
Finland 5.13 136.05 10 3.77% 6 
France 58.04 2,147.42 2 2.70% 10 
Germany 77.28 2,140.37 3 3.61% 8 
Ireland 1.80 200.57 9 0.90% 18 
Italy 50.93 2,217.91 1 2.30% 14 
Latvia 0.25 10.04 16 2.45% 12 
Lithuania 0.36 15.54 14 2.33% 13 
Luxembourg 0.74 10.85 15 6.83% 2 
Malta 0.25 5.77 17 4.26% 4 
Netherlands 16.36 434.09 6 3.77% 7 
Portugal 3.31 241.06 8 1.37% 17 
Slovakia 2.13 42.05 11 5.06% 3 
Slovenia 1.29 31.68 12 4.06% 5 
Spain 33.83 1,106.95 4 3.06% 9 
Total 270.45 9,504.17 -- 2.85% -- 
 
(a) 1 represents the largest, 18 the smallest debt 
(b) 1 represents the highest, 18 the lowest relative exposure 
 





Figure A.2: Government gross debt vs. exposure in % of gross government debt 
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